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ABSTRACT 
 
Is the benefit of reducing the size or probability of a recall worth the cost of the system?  
Recalls have the potential to incur large cost associated with loss of product, negative 
publicity, and legal judgments.  A model including the cost of traceability, probability that a 
recall occurs, costs associated with a recall, and severity of recall events is simulated using a 
random draw of probability and average size from a given distribution for both a 400 head 
per day and a 5,000 head per day beef plant.  For a small plant, it was estimated that the 
reduction in size of recall by 77 percent is required to breakeven while a greater than 99 
percent reduction in probability is required.  For a large plant, the breakeven point plant is 
found at a 7 percent reduction in size of a recall and 15 percent reduction in the probability of  
a recall.
1CHAPTER 1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
It has been estimated that 76 million illnesses, 325,000 hospitalizations, and 5,000 
deaths occur each year in the United States due to foodborne diseases (Mead, et. al., 1999).  
Of these statistics, Mead and others also estimate that 14 million illnesses, 60,000 
hospitalizations, and 1,800 deaths occur from known pathogens and 75% of these deaths are 
from Salmonella, Listeria monocytogenes, and Toxoplasma. However, Mead and others cite 
that from the Center for Disease Control in 1982 that over 200 diseases can be obtained 
through food.  The number of known diseases that can be obtained from food has 
undoubtedly risen since this time.   
The food industry has made vast changes in the type of products produced, especially 
within the last decade.  These changes include greater convenience foods, more ready-to-eat 
foods (RTE), and foods that combine different levels of preparation in a single container.  
The cooking step is the final hurdle in controlling pathogens in a typical environment. This 
step originally took place in a consumer’s home, but is now performed much earlier in the 
production process.  This shift in processing allows for greater opportunities for 
contamination before the product is consumed.  Food safety practices to prevent outbreaks 
have been the meat industries focus for investment.  These safety practices continually 
improve and are very much advanced from the beginnings of food safety in the Food Safety 
and Inspection Act of 1906 sparked by Sinclair’s The Jungle.
Even with the food industry’s great investment in the prevention of contamination or 
adulteration, there is still failure in current prevention methods.  Therefore, meat and poultry 
2recalls still occur.  From 1997 to 2004, 549 or nearly 69 recalls per year were conducted in 
conjunction with the Food Safety Inspection Service (FSIS).  A recall in the food industry 
may result in very large losses, as American Meat Institute (AMI) President Boyle stated, 
“Nothing is more damaging to a company’s reputation and profitability than a product 
recall.”  Bill Marler of Marler and Clark, a law firm that has represented thousands of food 
illness victims in over 30 states since 1993, reports that verdicts and settlements in cases of 
food poisoning have totaled nearly $200,000,000 (Marler, 2005).  The settlements and 
verdicts are primarily after the 1993, E. coli outbreak from Jack in the Box restaurants. 
The food industry’s potential to cause very adverse health effects to consumers due to 
microbial contamination or other safety risks, creates an interest to economists in the terms of 
potential economic loss to food producing, processing, or distribution entities (Piggott and 
Marsh 2002, Siaplay et al. 2005).  The meat industry in particular has been the target of many 
negative factors due to recalls.  Potential losses come in the form of cost of recovery, cost of 
disposal, and reimbursement for meat and poultry products, as well as negative publicity, and 
potential legal consequences.   
Some of these costs may be reduced or eliminated by the use of a traceability system 
in a meat and poultry plant.  The reduction of cost potentially may be due to reduced size of a 
recall or the decrease in chance that a recall occurs.   
Traceability can help eliminate recording errors and aid in keeping records which is a 
major part of a successful Hazard Analysis of Critical Control Points (HACCP) plan.  
Reassessing HACCP plans was a major factor in reducing recalls of beef due to Escherichia 
col (E. coli) (Pierson, 2005).   
3Furthermore, the need to quickly identify product that may be contaminated or 
possibly tampered with is essential in cases of emergency.  Pierson 2005, points out that in a 
time of crisis seconds may be critical in the communication chain and having the correct 
information readily available and technology to pass that information along may be very 
beneficial. 
Even though the National Animal Identification System (NAIS) has been strongly 
opposed in some aspects of the food animal industry, certain factors particularly in the recent 
past will provide the overall incentive for such a tracing system to be put in place.  These 
factors include the increase in awareness that the U.S., the safest food supply in the world, 
may need additional protection from potential terror risks. 9/11 provides evidence of 
vulnerabilities.  In addition, disease outbreaks pose threats such as Foot and Mouth Disease 
(FMD) which has been very detrimental to the food animal industry in Europe.  In the U.S., 
the effects of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) have been directly felt in the beef 
industry and the ever looming possibility of High Pathogen Avian Influenza (AI). 
Specifically, will the cost of implementing a traceability system with a cut-to-carcass 
level of precision, be covered by the cost benefits achieved during a recall situation.  The 
possible benefits due to a traceability system are to decrease the chance of a recall by better 
record keeping and not to allow product that has potential to cause a recall to escape the 
processor’s control.  Furthermore, the size of a recall may be reduced by being able to more 
accurately identify when and where a problem occurred and specifically which product was 
affected.  Also, the faster the product in a recall is removed from the retail shelf, the less 
likely that a cost will be incurred from harm to a consumer. 
4In addressing the problem, the major objectives are to determine whether the cost of a 
traceability system in a plant can be covered by the benefits of reducing the size of a recall or 
the probability that a recall will occur.  In achieving this objective, a model is simulated 
given an estimated probability of a recall, cost of a traceability system, as well as the cost of 
a recall.  The model is simulated for both a small beef plant of 400 head per day and a large 
plant of 5,000 head per day. 
5CHAPTER 2.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Background on Recalls
The Food Safety Inspection Service (FSIS) within the United States Department of 
Agriculture (USDA) is responsible for the inspection of all meat, poultry, and egg products 
that contain 3% or greater amenable product produced in federally inspected facilities 
(USDA1). The FSIS inspector helps to ensure safe, wholesome, and accurately labeled 
products.  In the event that one of these factors is not met, a recall is necessary.   A recall is a 
voluntary action by a manufacturer or distributor to remove food from commerce in order to 
protect the public from products that may cause health problems (USDA1).  A recall does not 
include a Market Withdrawal which is the removal of product from commerce for reasons 
that would not require legal action by FSIS or Stock Recovery which pertains to product that 
has not left the direct control of the firm (FSIS Dir. 8080.1, Rev. 4).  
All recalls are voluntary and done by the manufacturer or distributor and either are 
initiated by either the company or at the request of FSIS (USDA1).  However, FSIS only 
recommends a recall if they are ready to exercise their legal authority to detain and/or seize 
any products which are believed to be adulterated or misbranded (USDA1).  FSIS also has the 
option of removing inspectors from a facility, which would not allow product produced 
during that time to legally enter commerce.  Even when a recall is initiated by the 
manufacturer or distributor, the firm is expected to notify the FSIS Recall Management Staff 
(RMS) or Office of Field Operations (OFO) (FSIS Dir. 8080.1, Rev 4).  According to the 
FSIS Directive 8080.1 Revision 4, FSIS verifies all recall activities, coordinates recall 
6actions with the firm, and provides assistance or information to recalls conducted by state 
inspection agencies.   
FSIS lists four main ways that products which may require a recall are discovered:  1) 
The manufacturing or distributing company informs FSIS, 2) Through regular testing 
practices of FSIS, 3) FSIS field or program inspectors, and 4) State or local public health 
departments or other federal agencies such as the Center for Disease control (CDC) or Food 
and Drug Administration (FDA).  FSIS Directive 8080.1, Revision 4 also lists consumer 
complaints as a source for discovery of a potential recall situation.  Once the potential for a 
recall is brought to the attention of FSIS, the agency follows its procedure to determine the 
need for a recall.  The steps outlined in FSIS Directive 8080.1, Revision 4 are to conduct a 
preliminary inquiry, preliminary recall evaluation, and to make a recall recommendation.  
The preliminary inquiry step outlined is explained in further detail as collecting, 
documenting, and verifying information about the product of concern.  This information 
includes establishment number, company name and address, as well as company’s media and 
consumer contact personnel, and the reason for the potential recall.  Further information 
concerning all brand names, package types or codes, as well as any information about where 
the product may have entered commerce is collected.  The FSIS recall committee will then 
evaluate all potential health effects and a potential recall plan before making a decision as to 
whether a recall is deemed necessary.  The recall committee bases the need for a recall on 
three questions:  1) is there a reason to believe a product is adulterated or misbranded, 2) is 
the product available to consumers, and 3) is FSIS prepared to take action if a voluntary 
recall is not completed.  FSIS recommends a recall if these questions are answered “yes”. 
 
7FSIS recognizes three classifications of recalls which include:  
• A Class I recall is a health hazard situation where there is a reasonable 
probability that the use of the product will cause serious, adverse health 
consequences or death. Included in a Class I recall would be pathogens such 
as Listeria in ready-to-eat products or E. coli 0157:H7 in ground beef.   
• A Class II recall is a health hazard situation where there is a remote 
probability of adverse health consequences from the use of the product.  Class 
II recalls are typically cross contamination resulting in small amounts of 
undeclared allergens.  According to the USDA the top eight food allergens:  
peanuts, crustaceans, fish, tree nuts, eggs, milk, soy, and wheat are the cause 
of 90% of all food, allergic reactions. 
• A Class III is the lowest health risk recall where the use of the product will not 
cause adverse health consequences.  Class III recalls can be due to undeclared 
ingredients, but generally recognized as safe (GRAS), excluding allergens and 
maybe due to excess water or mislabeling (USDA/FSIS News Release August 
4, 2006 and FSIS Dir. 8080.1, Rev. 4). 
A Recall Notification Report (RNR) is generated to notify all Federal, State, and local 
health and food inspection agencies for all recalls.  A press release is issued for Class I and 
Class II recalls only unless a Class III recall was conducted due to adulterating a product for 
economical gains.  Press releases may not be issued if all product under suspicion has been 
recovered before a release could be issued (FSIS Dir. 8080.1, Rev. 4).  A press release 
contains a description of the product, reason, and risk associated with the recall, as well as 
the intended destination of the product (FSIS Dir. 8080.1, Rev. 4).  
8The total number of recalls was compiled from the FSIS RNR’s and Press Releases 
and is reported in Figure 1.  The RNR’s do not include recalls that occurred in State 
inspected facilities. 
 Figure 1. 
 
The number of recalls range from a low of 27 in 1997 to a high of 129 in 2002.  
During this eight year period a total of 549 Recalls were conducted and an average of 69 per 
year.  
During this same time period, the pounds of product recalled are illustrated in Figure 
2.  The range for the pounds of recalls per year is from 58.2 million in 2002 to 2.9 million in 
2004.  The average pounds recalled per year was 29.1 million pounds with an average size of 
437,081 pounds per recall.  The average size of recall was calculated based on 532 of the 
total 549 recalls, as 17 RNR did not specify the pounds of product to be recalled.  The 
pounds recalled were much greater in 2002, which was due to a larger than normal increase 
in recalls due mainly to L. monocytogenes, allergens, and E. coli. 
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The number of Class I, II, and III recalls per year are shown in Figure 3.  The total 
recalls over the period are: 419 Class I, 78 Class II, and 52 Class III.   
Figure 3.  Number of Recalls per year by Class 
Year Total Recalls Class I Class II Class III 
1997 27 16 11 0 
1998 44 32 10 2 
1999 62 54 7 1 
2000 76 65 8 3 
2001 95 69 12 14 
2002 129 97 15 17 
2003 68 45 12 11 
2004 48 41 3 4 
Total 549 419 78 52 
Causes of Recalls
Listeria mononcytogenes (L. mononcytogenes), the single leading cause for a recall 
from the data compiled between 1997 and 2004, along with Salmonella were the cause of 
195 recalls, which is 36% of the total 549 recalls.  An additional pathogen, Escherichia coli 
(E. coli) 0157:H7, was also a major reason for meat and poultry recalls during this time 
10 
period.  The total recalls for L. monocytogenes, E. coli, and Salmonella account for 323 
recalls or 59% of the recalls over the years 1997-2004.  The numbers of total recalls for each 
cause over the time period are illustrated in Figure 4 and the number or recalls per year by 
cause is in Appendix A.  The illness/pathogen category includes pathogens besides L. 
monocytogenes, E. coli, and Salmonella or an illness caused by an unidentified pathogen.  
Foreign material would include any glass, plastic, metal, oil, drug, or chemical.  Common 
allergens in meat and poultry recalls include soy, dairy, peanuts, fish, or shell fish.  The 
labeling category includes mislabeling, undeclared ingredients, and misbranding.  Other 
reasons consist of undercooking, illegal entry into the United States, improper cooling, 
Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE), not properly USDA inspected, undocumented 
formulation, spoilage, and held or produced under unsanitary conditions. 
 
Figure 4.  Reason for Recall 
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Listeria monocytogenes
Listeria monocytogenes, the single greatest cause of meat and poultry recalls from 1997-
2004, accounted for 31% of the total. L. monocytogenes, is considered an adulterant1 in RTE 
meat and poultry products and would be a cause for a Class I recall, as it is a pathogenic 
bacterium.  Meat and Poultry products containing L. monocytogenes are prohibited from 
entering any form of commerce by the Federal Meat Inspection Act (FMIA) and the Poultry 
Products Inspection Act (PPIA).  L. monocytogenes is commonly found within the 
environment including soil, water, and vegetation.  The CDC reports a 20% fatality rate for 
L. moncytogenes and is of particular concern to the elderly and infants since the fatality rate 
increases with the age extremes (Federal Register, 2003).  Furthermore, 28% of food-related 
deaths have been estimated to be caused by L. monocytogenes (Mead, et. al., 1999). 
Listeriosis can cause still births in pregnant women.  Immunocompromised persons are at 
greater risk including cancer patients undergoing Chemotherapy or Human 
Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV).  The USDA requires one of three options for additional 
control of L. monocytogenes in ready-to-eat products.  The first is by sanitation alone, which 
includes additional testing of the product and contact surfaces.  Second would be 
reformulation of the product to include antimicrobial agents2 such as lactates or diacetates to 
control L. monocytogenes.
1 A meat or poultry product is adulterated if it contains any poisonous or deleterious substance that may render it injurious to 
health (21 U.S.C 601 (m) (1), 453 (g) (1)).  Also, if it has been prepared, packed, or held under unsanitary conditions whereby it may have 
been rendered injurious to health (21 U.S.C 601 (m) (1), 453 (g) (1)). 
2 An Antimicrobial Agent is defined by FSIS in 9 CFR 430.1 as a substance in or added to an RTE product that has the effect of 
reducing or eliminating a microorganism or of suppressing or limiting its growth throughout the shelf life of the product. 
 
12 
Lastly, a post-lethality1 process2 of the product is an option, which may include an in 
package method (Federal Register, 2003).  The number of positive samples in L. 
monocytogenes testing of ready-to-eat meat products has declined from 1995 to 2003 from a  
high of 3.02% in 1995 to a low of 0.75% in 2003 (Murano, 2004).  However, from the data 
compiled during this research 171 recalls were due to L. monocytogenes or 31% of the total 
549 recalls between 1997 and 2004, and 41% of the 419 Class I recalls.  The trend of the 
food industry toward more convenience type products including fully cooked meat or poultry 
make L. monocytogenes into a primary concern due to the nature of the organism.  It is 
psychrotrophic meaning it can live and reproduce at refrigerated temperatures and as stated 
by Samelis and Metaxopoulos (1999) at temperatures around 0oC.  L. monocytogenes is 
typically more heat resistant than other non-spore forming pathogens and has been shown to 
have a D value3 at 70C of 0.14 to 0.27, and would require two minutes at 70C to achieve a 6 
Log reduction (Gaze et. al., 1989).  However, Lin et. al. (2006) states that when comparing 
isolates the raw product is rarely the source of contamination in the final product.  This is in 
agreement with other studies as the processing environment including equipment and 
personnel have been suggested as of a greater source of L. monocytogenes in product 
(Nesbakken, et. al., 1996, Lin et. al. 2006, RØrik, et. al., 1995). 
 
1 The processing environment in which a product may be exposed which has gone through an initial lethality process. FSIS 9 
CFR 430 
 
2 A post-lethality treatment is applied to the final product or sealed package after post-lethality exposure to reduce or eliminate 
pathogens. FSIS 9 CFR 430 
 
3 The D value is defined as the time required to reduce the number of organisms by 1 log or 90% at a given temperature. 
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Due to the nature of production of certain products that require contact of equipment 
or personnel especially slicers, after cooking, FSIS has classified deli meats and frankfurters 
as a high risk to L. monocytogenes (Federal Register, 2003). 
Escherichia coli 0157:H7
Escherichia coli 0157:H7 the second most frequent cause of meat and poultry recalls 
from 1997-2004 accounted for 128 of 549 or 23% of the total.  Furthermore, 3% of food-
related deaths have been estimated to be caused by E. coli (Mead, et. al., 1999).   
Cattle are the primary source of E.  coli, as they are carriers of the organism in their 
intestine, which may be transferred to the carcass; consequently, undercooked ground beef is 
of primary concern with the contraction of the infection.  The onset of the disease is typically 
3-4 days after ingestion of the live organism (CDC, 2006).  Clinical symptoms associated 
with E. coli include bloody diarrhea and abdominal cramps, as well as hemolytic uremic 
syndrome (HUS) a condition causing kidney failure and destruction of red blood cells. (CDC, 
2006)  Most symptoms are reduced after 5-10 days; yet, the development of HUS can have 
permanent health consequences such as blindness, paralysis, kidney failure or abnormalities 
in later years, or bowel removal (CDC, 2006).  An E. coli infection can be prevented by 
cooking food to the proper temperature as the organism is killed if the temperature reaches 
160F (USDA). 
Non-intact beef as defined by FSIS is adulterated if found to contain E. coli or 
product intended to be processed into non-intact product that will not go through further 
processing sufficient to kill the pathogen.  Trimmings are considered intact beef and non-
intact product is any beef that has gone through a mechanized process such as grinding, 
cubing, injection or tenderization.   
14 
Salmonella
According to the USDA Salmonellosis is the second most reported foodborne illness 
and is estimated to cause 1.4 million sicknesses, 16,000 cases causing hospitalization, and 
600 deaths by the CDC.  However, Salmonella was only responsible for 24 or the 549 recalls 
which is 4% of the total meat and poultry recalls reported from 1997-2004. 
Salmonellosis is caused by Salmonella and has reported symptoms of diarrhea, fever, 
or abdominal cramps with a typical cycle lasting 4-7 days (ERS, 2003).  The organism lives 
in the intestinal tracts of animals.  As with other illnesses infants and the elderly are the most 
adversely affected, particularly the elderly as the majority of the deaths occur in persons 
older than 65 (ERS, 2003).  Salmonella has been shown to survive at high temperatures if it 
can shed some of it’s own water during low humidity of the early cooking process (ProMED-
mail, 2003).  This means that heat must be applied in combination with humidity as the 
organism is capable of surviving a dry heat.  It has been reported that the lethality wet-bulb 
temperature to kill Salmonella is 130F for two hours, 140F for 12 minutes, or 160F for 8 
seconds (ProMED-mail, 2003).  This organism may be of particular concern to products that 
are dried during processing, such as jerky, semi-dry sausages, and dry sausages, in which 
higher humidity would be undesirable as it would lengthen the thermal treatment. 
Furthermore, 31% of food-related deaths have been estimated to be caused by Salmonella 
(Mead, et. al., 1999). 
Traceability
Traceability is defined by Golan et al. (2004) and Souza-Monterio and Caswell 
(2004) as the ability to follow the history, application, or location, of that which is under 
consideration, particularly food through the production processes.  As described by Caporale 
15 
et al.  (2001) the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) further adds to the 
definition as the ability to document all relevant movements, processes, and controls needed 
to define an animal/animal product’s life or history.  It is understood that the system must be 
able to document these activities in a timely manner to be effective.  
Traceability can be measured in three ways breadth, depth, and precision.  Golan et 
al.  (2004) and Smith (2005) Breadth is the total amount of information collected to define an 
animal product through the production process.  Depth is how far forward or backward in a 
production process that a product’s history can be traced.  Precision is the degree of 
assurance that a system can pinpoint movement (Golan et al.  2004 and Smith 2005).  
Identity preservation is also referred to as traceability and is suggested to include inputs in 
the food marketing chain (Liddell and Bailey 2001).  Transparency is a term used to describe 
the information that is available to outside sources such as the rules, procedures, and 
practices along a food chain (Baines and Davies 1998 and Liddell and Bailey 2001).  
 The recent outbreaks of Foot and Mouth disease in Europe, high pathogenic avian 
influenza abroad, and particularly BSE in the United States beef industry in December of 
2003 have provided the incentive for APHIS to start planning an animal identification 
system.  The United States Animal Identification Plan (October 2003) was developed by 
government officials as a basis for a system that allows for complete tracing of an individual 
animal’s premise history within 48 hours.  From the USAIP the National Animal 
Identification System (NAIS) was announced in April of 2004, which was developed by a 
team of 100 people representing 70 groups involved in the animal food industry.  This team 
built on the USAIP and focused on the beef industry as the starting point for traceability.   
16 
The National Animal Identification System is referred to as the “Live Animal 
System.”  NAIS is designed to trace an animal’s entire history within 48 hours of an 
infectious disease outbreak.  The history includes each premise the animal was ever at, as 
well as other animals that it came into contact with throughout its lifetime.  A premise is 
defined by USDA as a unique and describable geographic location where activity affecting 
the health and/or traceability of animals may occur.  Furthermore, a premise is further 
defined as any place that animals commingle and a spread of disease may occur, which 
include but are not limited to sale barns, farms, shows, feedlots, and packing plants.  In 
NAIS, Premises must be registered by a seven digit code and attributes of premise recorded 
with the USDA.  These attributes include contact name, type of premise, and location.  As of 
March 9, 2007, 374,289 or 26% of the total 1,438,280 premises have been registered in all 50 
states including 2 territories, and 5 tribes.  Currently, Wisconsin is the only state that has 
required premise registration.  States such as Texas has postponed premise registration due to 
the strong opposition by producers.  Vermont has also postponed premise registration until 
USDA has a detailed plan of action.  The USDA timeline for a trace system was to start 
identification of individual animals in March of 2006, by June 2006 have a cooperative 
agreement with private or State held tracking databases, and by 2007 the databases were to 
be operational (Adams and Wilson, 2004).  Currently, the USDA is issuing animal 
identification numbers and storing information in USDA held databases.  Although originally 
proposed as a mandatory program, participation in the program remains voluntary. 
Mandatory animal identification is opposed by some producers as they believe this 
infringes on their personal freedom.  Producers also are aware that an added cost is 
associated with the ability to track an animal.  The tracking of an animal to the final 
17 
inspection station alone may not provide enough economic incentive for producers to support 
such a program.  Still other producers prefer a vertical traceability system to allow for 
adequate branding of their product (Mennecke and Townsend 2005).  About 53% of food 
processors feel the cost outweigh the benefits, while an even larger percentage of producers 
believe this (Crews, J. 2004).  Many individuals along the food chain are concerned with an 
added liability, but as in the case of the BSE animals in the U.S., the origin of the animals 
was still discovered, but it took a longer time period.  A traceability system does not change 
the laws of who is liable in food safety litigation, but if the source of hazards are positively 
identified it is easier to hold the guilty agents responsible (Souza-Monterio and Caswell 
2004).  This may also be an incentive for food processors to take pro-active measures to 
reduce any food safety concerns (Souza-Monteiro and Caswell 2004). 
In contrast to opposition, an accurate record of traceability may provide proof that all 
measures were taken to ensure that food safety concerns were met; therefore, reducing the 
risk of being wrongfully held liable.  This has been evidenced by HACCP records, which 
only pertain to food safety issues not quality.  The basis of most recalls is a clear food safety 
issue as most Recall Notification Reports are class I recalls, the most likely to cause severe 
health effects.  HACCP records can provide assistance in determining lot codes and materials 
or ingredients that may be included in a product during the event of a recall (Scott 2006).  
HACCP records must be kept for at least one year relative to slaughter processes or non-shelf 
stable refrigerated products, while frozen or shelf stable product records must be kept for two 
years (Scott 2006 and USDA/FSIS). 
However,  the debatable topic of traceability not only raises questions about the 
benefits of knowing information versus the cost of giving up privacy, but also the cost of 
18 
implementing a system versus the benefits that the system provides.   If the animal 
identification system becomes mandatory, it is determined to end in the food chain when the 
animal is declared wholesome and safe to enter the food supply by a USDA inspector 
(USDA2).  USDA is currently making no plans for a mandatory system (USDA2).  The 
USDA and States would only collect and retain necessary identification data in the 
preharvest production chain and through final inspection at slaughter establishments 
(USDA2).   
Linking the information from producers of the live animal to the food product may 
prove valuable for harvesting facilities to continue the tracing of each carcass.  Once a live 
animal trace back system is in place the necessary infrastructure is in place to allow 
information to be tied to an animal with little cost or effort.  This may allow for the 
identification of credence attributes through the food chain to the final product.  These 
attributes may be of added value, but are not readily identifiable in the finished product.  
Credence attributes may include product from animals with certain handling practices prior 
to harvest or the type of feed such as organic or grass fed. 
Many facilities already track a group of carcasses rather than individual carcasses to 
be able to pay the producer on a grid based on USDA quality and yield grades, carcass 
weight, and premiums or discounts.  Tracking may be taken a step further to identify 
individual carcass traits which may be relayed to the producer to make decisions such as 
genetics, feed rations, marketing weight, or handling methods.  This valuable information  to 
the producer may support some of the cost of an ID system.   
Traceability can provide a premium or value for information to not only cover the 
cost of a tracing system, but may provide a profit.  It is well researched that consumers are 
19 
willing to pay a premium for certain attributes for their food supply (Dickinson and Bailey, 
2001).  If international consumers are willing to pay more for traceability attributes of a 
product, the United States producers that do not have traceability may not receive the same 
premium as producers in other countries whom have traceability systems in place.  In the 
United Kingdom, traceability actually ranked ahead of price when supermarkets purchased 
meat (Dickinson and Bailey, 2001).  Traceability premiums for a $3.00 roast beef sandwich 
were estimated to be $0.23 for basic traceability, $0.50 for animal treatment, and $0.63 for 
guaranteed food safety, and $1.06 for all the attributes combined (Dickinson and Bailey, 
2001).  Consumers in Canada have also shown a willingness to pay less than a 10% premium 
on a $2.50 roast beef sandwich for traceability (Hobbs, 2003).  The United States may lose a 
portion of its market share if prices are similar and the product has less attributes.  Many of 
the U.S.’s export markets are requesting traceability including Japan the largest importer of 
US beef prior to 2004 (Vanderveer, 2007). 
When trade is open to Japan only carcasses from beef animals 20 months of age or 
less are permitted.  To ensure that no carcasses of animals older than 20 months have been 
allowed a USDA grader assigns a maturity score based on physiological maturity.  To allow 
for error between physiological and chronological age, a maturity score of A 40 
approximately 15.8 months was determined acceptable for Japanese export. This reduced the 
error of including a carcasses of an animal greater than 20 months to less than 0.01% 
(Ransom, 2005).  Carcasses in this maturity range represent about 8% of the beef harvested 
in the United States (Ransom, 2005).  If the age could be verified by previous tracing of an 
animal, a larger portion of the beef supply would be eligible for export to Japan which would 
lead to a wider market base.   
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Domestic markets are beginning to require higher levels of traceability.  McDonald’s 
the world’s largest food service company and buyer of beef, including over 1 billion pounds 
per year in the U.S. alone is paying a premium for the ability to trace the beef it purchases to 
a particular lot (Ishmael, 2005).  In some areas where traceability is more difficult to achieve, 
it is reported that McDonald’s is offering a premium of up to $30 per head for traceability 
(Ishmael, 2005).  The world’s largest retailer of meat is Wal-Mart which has issued mandates 
that its top 100 suppliers use RFID tags on pallets and cases (Arnold, 2005).  Traceability 
only allows for the identification of attributes and does not create any specific quality 
attributes for a product along the supply chain.  Although traceability itself may become a 
quality or brand attribute (Mennecke and Townsend, 2005). 
An important question that was raised by Golan et al. (2004) is what level of 
traceability is economically efficient.  Menneke and Townsend (2005) added identification of 
food products from individual animals through the entire food chain may not be efficient and 
a production lot may be optimal.  The optimum amount of traceability may be a difficult 
question to access. When determining the cost of a traceability system it becomes more 
expensive and complicated as the precision becomes greater; therefore, an efficient level to 
ensure a profit must be determined.  Reduced recall expense due to smaller lot size may play 
a role in determining a level of equilibrium.  In future marketing of a product, the question of 
the optimal amount of traceability may be outweighed by the question of whether a product 
can be marketed at all without traceability (Beil 2005). 
A certain level of traceability must exist within a plant for food safety including 
HACCP records, as well as allowing payment to be made to producers based on merit of 
carcasses.  In a processing facility, additional traceability may offer greater food safety and 
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reduced size of recalls or the number of recalls.  Is the benefit of reduce costs from recalls 
large enough to offset costs from additional tracing of products. 
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CHAPTER 3. METHODS AND MATERIALS 
 
Objectives
The objective is to determine the cost and benefit trade off between the cost of 
traceability and benefits in both a large and small scale animal harvesting/processing facility.  
A large facility is defined as 5,000 head of beef per day and a small facility is defined as 400 
head of beef per day.  Specifically, will the cost of implementing a traceability system with a 
cut-to-carcass level of precision, be covered by the benefits achieved during a recall 
situation.  The possible benefits associated with improved traceability are to decrease the 
probability of a recall by better record keeping and not allowing product that has potential to 
cause a recall to escape the processor’s control.  Furthermore, the size of a recall may be 
reduced by being able to more accurately identify when and where a problem occurred and 
specifically which product was affected.  Also, the faster the product in a recall is removed 
from the retail shelf, the less likely that cost will be incurred from harm to a consumer.  In 
achieving the objectives, an economic model was used taking into consideration pre-event 
actions; i.e., investment in a traceability system.  Post-event actions or the direct costs of a 
recall will be considered, as well as a loss function to account for economic loss to a 
consumer due to negative adverse effects from consuming a product included in a recall.  The 
hypothesis is that the benefits of reduced cost associated with recall will be of value, but may 
not entirely cover the cost of such a precise traceability system. 
Model
Elbakidze and McCarl (2006) developed a model that can be used in a number of 
events that have a low probability of occurrence but with very large losses, and that the 
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effects may be reduced by taking actions before such events occur.  In this particular model 
animal disease preparedness or pre-event factors were economically weighed against the 
probability of an outbreak occurring and post-event factors.  The animal disease in 
consideration was Foot and Mouth, which included an estimate of the low probability of 
occurrence, cost of factors that would help to control an outbreak, and the cost of post-
outbreak factors. 
 We used the model in equation (i) by Elbakidze and McCarl (2006) to determine the 
cost effectiveness of using a traceability system to reduce the cost of a recall. 
Equation (i). [ ( , , ) ] (1 )s r sC P L s r w s w r P w s=  + + + 
The model was applied in a micro manner to a specific plant rather to the industry as 
a whole.  The focus of the model is (C) or the average cost of a recall considering ingoing 
factors.  We have considered pre-event factors (s) or pounds of product to be traced, 
probability of event (P), and post-event factors (r), as well as the severity of events ( )
stemming from a recall situation. Where (w) is the unit cost of s or r respectively.  An 
estimation of the value for each factor is plugged into the model, then simulated 1.5 million 
times with Crystal Ball software 7.2.2.  It is simulated using two random variables; 
probability of a recall and average recall size.  The software takes the average for all the 
simulations having a random draw for both probability and average size of a recall.  
Pre-Event Factors
Traceability is the only factor that is chosen to be analyzed as a pre-event factor in 
this model.  Other pre-event factors include, but are not limited to PR/HACCP 
implementation of more stringent SOP’s, GMP’s, and SSOP’s. Also recall insurance may 
help to cover some of the costs associated with a recall which may included direct recall 
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expenses, such as recovering and disposal of the product, as well as any additional product 
testing to aid in the recall process.  Other expenses that may also be included are public 
relations expenses both during and for a time period after a recall occurs to aid in 
rehabilitation of the consumer’s perception (www.meatami.com accessed 10/24/06). 
The pre-event factors include both (ws) the unit cost of traceability and s the pounds 
of product being traced through the plant.  (Ws) has been estimated from private sources to be 
from $0.03 to $0.07 per carcass or $0.00009537 and $0.00004087 per pound respectively for 
a large plant and for a small plant up to $9.54 per carcass or $0.013 per pound.  The 
differences in the cost of traceability for a small versus a large plant are partially due to 
economies of scale.  The same technology cost spread over 400 head would be larger per unit 
than the cost spread over 5,000 head.  Additionally, the estimates from private sources may 
be for traceability systems of varying precision.  The large plants cost may be under 
estimated by privates sources whom market this type of technology.  To compensate for cost 
variations, a sensitivity analysis was performed for varying cost levels of traceability. 
In determining the pounds of product traced within a plant, an estimate of the number 
of head per day was multiplied by the number of days worked per week and by the number of 
weeks worked per year.  The result is the number of head harvested per year.  The number 
per year is multiplied by an average carcass weight, resulting in the pounds produced per 
year in a commercial plant.  The number of pounds produced per year are displayed in Figure 
5.  The average hot carcass weight was determined from USDA’s Red Meat Yearbook.  The 
total estimated head harvested between 1997 and 2004 was 283.5 million and the total 
production of commercial meat was 208.2 billion pounds.  Therefore, the weighted average 
for carcass weight was 734lbs; the simple average over each year was also 734lbs. 
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Figure 5.   
Head per day 400 5,000 
Days per week 5 5 
Weeks per year 51 51 
Total Head per year 102,000 1,275,000 
Average HCWT 734 734 
Total lbs. per year 74,868,000 935,850,000 
Total bnls. lbs per year 37,434,000 467,925,000 
Probability
Determining the probability of a recall in the meats industry provides many 
challenges.  These challenges occur because of the large number of transactions between 
production, wholesale, distribution, and retail, which all have potential to cause a recall.  This 
is also a very large industry as the total meat and poultry consumption in the U.S. between 
1997 and 2004 totaled 477.6 billion pounds with and average of 59.7 billion pounds per year.  
Consumption totals were estimated from per capita consumption of beef, veal, pork, lamb, 
chicken, and turkey, multiplied by U.S. population per year reported by the Economic 
Research Service (ERS).  Consumption of all species were totaled using a retail cut 
equivalent except turkey which was based on a boneless, trimmed equivalent as a retail cut 
basis was not available.  The eight year span of data was chosen to provide a good estimate 
of the consumption while providing the ability to accurately forecast future events, as this 
will include the most common practices currently effecting variables in the model.  The main 
industry practice is the Pathogen Reduction/Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Points 
(PR/HACCP) that was introduced as legislation in February 1995 and passed in July of 1996. 
This required establishments in the food industry to have written standards in place by 
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January of 1997.  Therefore, the data analyzed began in 1997 and continued through year 
2004 which was the most current data available from ERS.   
The total pounds of all meat and poultry recalled for the same time period 1997-2004 
was taken from Recall Notification Reports (RNR) in FSIS Recall Case Archives.  The total 
pounds recalled were 232.5 million with 549 recalls averaging 423,547 pounds per recall 
over the eight years.  The probability of a recall per pound is calculated as pounds recalled 
(232.5 million) divided by total consumption (477.6 billion), for a probability of 0.00049 per 
pound.  This probability per pound can then be multiplied by the total pounds produced in a 
plant, which has been converted to a boneless, closely trimmed basis.  The boneless closely 
trimmed percentage is based on a Yield Grade 3 carcass, which USDA predicts to be 
between 47.7% and 50.0%.  Therefore, the average hot carcass weight is multiplied by the 
estimated percent of boneless, closely trimmed retail cuts.  This is divided by the average 
recall size to give the probability of having an average sized recall.  It is relevant to note that 
these recalls only included FSIS or federal recalls and do not include the recalls conducted in 
conjunction with the 28 state inspection services.  Also, 17 federal recalls were not included 
in the total pounds during this time as the amount to be recalled was not reported.  For both 
of these situations, state conducted recalls and recalls without pounds reported, the total 
amount of recalls and quantity would increase.  Two factors that would decrease the number 
and amount of recalls are reports of recalls included that at least a portion was exported 
outside the U.S. and recalls that were of product that included foods other than meat and 
poultry, such as chicken salads or chili. 
Furthermore, the probability of a significant recall was calculated in the same manner, 
defined as a recall of 5,000 pounds or greater.  For this the number of recalls of 5,000 pounds 
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or greater was 279 for a total of 232.2 million pounds with an average size of 832,429.  
Therefore, the total pounds recalled in recalls of 5,000 pounds and greater is divided by the 
total consumption (232,247,656 lbs / 477,589,913,700 lbs).  This gives the probability of a 
recall per pound.  This is multiplied by the total pounds produced on a boneless weight.  The 
boneless weight is determined by multiplying the total pounds produced per year by an 
average percent of boneless closely trimmed retail cuts for both a small and large plant and 
represented in Figure 5.  This is then divided by the average recall size to get the probability 
that will be used in the model which is the probability of having an average size recall in both 
a small and large plant.  The probability of having an average sized recall during the year for 
a small plant is 0.02189 and 0.27268 for a large plant. 
Post-Event Factors
Recalls have many factors that incur cost associated with post-event factors.  These 
events include the physical recall of product in question, cost of replacing product or 
refunding the value of product, and disposal of product.  Other costs may come in the form of 
governmental fines and/or legal actions by entities that were harmed.  Indirect cost may also 
result from recall in the form of negative publicity and decreased consumer demand for 
products.  AMI which offers insurance on recalls list possible costs that are included in the 
coverage plan as recall expenses of actual product, storage or moving of product, and further 
testing of product, lost profit up to one year, customer’s expenses, rehabilitation expenses to 
restore market share and public relations, and crisis management related managing a recall. 
 In our estimation of recall post-event costs, the unit cost (wr) and pounds of product 
recalled (r) are considered.  The unit cost is based on an average retail price of beef from the 
ERS/Bureau of Labor and Statistics (BLS) (www.lmic.info) based on a Choice, Yield Grade 
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3 carcass, which is $3.25.  In addition, to the average retail price 40 percent over the retail 
product cost was added to cover other recall expenses that give a total of $4.55.  These 
expenses include but are not limited to physical recovery of product, disposal, and decreased 
consumer demand.  The pounds of product are the total boneless pounds per year for both a 
small and large plant, also listed in Figure 5. 
Severity of Recall Events
The potential severity of a recall situation was based on the ERS cost estimates of the 
foodborne disease Salmonella (ERS, 2007).  These estimates were compiled from various 
sources including:  Medical costs from the MarketScan database of MEDSTAT Group and 
lost productivity from the National Health Interview Survey. 
The costs are a subdivided into four categories;  a full recovery without a physician, 
full recovery with physician, full recovery with hospitalization, and hospitalization along 
with death.  The costs are the total economic effect including medical expenses, lost 
productivity, and premature death. Based on the total economic effect of all the categories 
and the number of cases for each an average economic impact of $2,126 is determined.  The 
total economic impact reported by ERS for each category is in Figure 6.  The total cases 
reported is divided by the total pounds of consumption for the number of cases per pound of 
product consumed.  Then the number of cases per pound (0.000002958) is multiplied by the 
weighted average per case ($2,126) for a cost per pound of product ($0.00629).  The cost per 
pound is then multiplied by the pounds produced on a boneless basis within a plant for the 
total cost to the plant, which is $235,386.14 for a small plant and $2,942,326.73 for a large 
plant.   
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Figure 6.  Total economic impact of Salmonella.  Source ERS 
Severity of Case Number of Cases Total Economic Impact (Million dollars) 
No physician; recover fully 1,294, 107 55.6 
Visit physician; recover fully 101,903 40.9 
Hospitalized; recover fully 15,906 208.6 
Hospitalized; die 582 2,698.0 
Total 1,412,498 3,003.1 
Weighted Average  $2,216.00 
In support of possible costs if the product in a recall causes injury to the consumer, 
Marler Clark Attorneys at Law a well known as a leader in food borne illness litigation lists 
settlements and verdicts due to food borne illness such as a $15.6 million settlement for the 
most seriously injured person in the 1993, E. coli outbreak at Jack in the Box. Marler and 
Clark also list a $4.6 million verdict for eleven children who were sickened by E. coli due to 
hamburger in school lunches at Finley, Washington in 1998. 
 
Comparative Static Analysis
Equation 1 is the base model and contains all the variables under consideration.  P is 
the probability or the likelihood that and event would occur and in our particular case a recall 
of meat or poultry.  (L) is a function of variables that would represent to the economic loss if 
a recall occurs.  The variables in the loss function are the (s) the pre-event factors, which in 
this case the event is a recall of meat or poultry and the pre-event factor is the investment in a 
traceability network.  While (r) is the post-event or recall factors which would include any 
cost associated with the occurrence of a recall.  The remaining variable ( ) is a measure of 
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the severity of the recall and any adverse effects from such an event.  Furthermore, ws
represents the per unit cost of traceability prior to a recall occurring, while wr is the unit cost 
of post recall factors.  Additionally, the P is also included on the right hand side of the 
equation as 1-P multiplied by the traceability or pre-event factors as the cost of traceability 
will still be incurred regardless of the chance of a recall.  However, the post recall expenses 
will only be expressed if a recall occurs and is directly reflected by the estimate of P. 
Equation 1.  [ ( , , ) ] (1 )s r sC P L s r w s w r P w s=  + + + 
The first order conditions are derived by taking the derivative of Equation 1 with 
respect to both traceability (s) and (r) adverse effects of a recall and are represented in 
Equation 2 and 3 respectively. 
First order conditions 
Equation 2.  ( , , ) 0s sPL s r w + =
Equation 3.  ( , , ) 0r rL s r w + =
The model is then represented in a matrix form as in Equation 4 from which Cramer’s 
rule is applied to be used in a comparative static analysis.  Equations 5-12 are the results of 
derivatives of both pre-event actions (s) and post-event consequences (r) with respect to each 
of the fixed variables:  cost of traceability (ws), cost of a recall (wr), severity of recall events 
( ), and the probability of a recall (P). 
Equation 4. 
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Equation 5. 
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Equation 6. 
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A comparison of pre-event, post-event, severity, and probability was done by a 
comparative static analysis.  From Equation 1, first order conditions were determined by 
taking the derivative of both cost of pre-event and cost of post-event factors and set equal to 
0.  Using Cramer’s rule the comparative analysis by Elbakidze and McCarl 2006 was verified 
and the detailed formulas are in appendix A.  After verifying that the previous analysis was 
correct, it was applied to a meat and poultry recall scenario.  In the case of Equation 5, a 
downward sloping demand curve is shown by the negative sign; therefore, a higher unit cost 
of the pre-event action of traceability the less of that factor would be demanded.  This 
supports common expectations that the more costly a traceability system is then the less 
likely a meat processor will invest in this particular technology. 
Equation 8 can readily be signed as negative, which in our model is determined by 
deriving with respect to cost of post event factors.  The negative sign also shows a downward 
sloping demand curve or simply the higher the cost of post event actions or expenses 
associated with a recall indicates less recalls are more desirable.  This is also as expected.  
The signs of both Equation 9 and 10 are dependent on the sign and magnitude of Lsr,
LsP, and LrP as stated by Elbakidze and McCarl, which are respectively; the loss due to 
traceability with respect to a recall, the loss due to traceability with respect to the severity of 
the recall, and loss due to a recall with respect to severity of a recall.  However, in Equation 9 
it would be expected that an increase in the severity of factors associated with a recall would 
have a positive sign or more pre-event security. 
 Yet, with Equation 10 a negative sign is expected as an increase in the severity of a 
recall would lead you to expect a decreasing demand curve for any post-event recall factors. 
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 The sign for Equation 11 follows the presumed pattern of having a positive or 
increasing demand curve.  This indicates an increase of the probability of the occurrence of a 
recall, and will also result in the increase in the demand for pre-event actions or traceability. 
 Equation 12 is essentially meaningless except for supporting the model in that it has a 
positive sign, which means that as the probability of a recall increases so does the post-event 
recall factors. 
Computer Simulation
The model was simulated using Crystal Ball 7.2.2 an add-in for Excel.  The model 
simulated the average cost for a recall.  The fixed variables included the cost of traceability 
per pound, pounds produced per year for the plant, cost of recovering recalled product, as 
well as cost of negative consequences based on the severity of the case.  The probability was 
a random variable simulated by a triangular distribution with a maximum of 1 and minimum 
of 0 and the mean estimated from data as the likeliest value.  The likeliest value for a small 
plant was 0.02189 and 0.27268 for a large plant.  Average recall size was the second random 
variable simulated with a lognormal distribution using the mean and standard deviation from 
the recall notification reports of pounds of product recalled.  The mean recall size is 832,429 
with a standard deviation of 4,061,619 pounds.  The distribution of pounds recalled is 
illustrated in Figure 7, which is most accurately represented as lognormal.  In the simulation 
the distribution is based on recalls of 5000 pounds and greater.  This included 279 recalls 
with a total of 232,247,656 pounds and an average size of 832,429 pounds.  The model was 
then simulated 1.5 million times the largest number possible with the available equipment.  
This simulation was run for both a small 400 head per day plant and a large 5000 head per 
day plant.  The fixed variable of traceability for each plant used a traceability cost of $0.013 
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per pound in a small plant and $0.07 per head in a large plant.  The model for a 400 head a 
day plant is below with the average plugged in for the simulated variables probability and 
average size of a recall. 
 
0.02189[$235,386.14 ($0.013*74,868,000)C = + +
($4.55*37,434,000)] (1 0.02189)($0.013*74,868,000)+ 
The same model for a 5,000 head per day is listed below. 
 0.27268[$2,942,326.73 ($0.00009537*935,850,000)C = + +
($4.55*467,925,000)] (1 0.27268)($0.00009537*935,850,000)+ 
Figure 7. Distribution of recalled pounds 
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CHAPTER 4.  RESULTS 
 
The results of the simulation or recall cost per year for a plant harvesting 400 head 
per day are in Figure 8.  A small plant of 400 head per day is shown with an expected cost 
per year of recalls; without traceability, with traceability and no change to the recall costs, as 
well as a decrease of 50% to the average size of a recall, standard deviation of recall size, and 
the probability that a recall will occur.  Also, the cost per head and cost per pound on a 
boneless retail basis are included.  
 
Figure 8.  Average simulated recall cost of a 400 head per day plant. 
 Average Cost Cost per head Cost per pound 
No Traceability $1,372,009 $13.45 $0.04 
Traceability without 
benefits $2,343,751 $22.98 $0.06 
Traceability reduced 
recall size by 50% $1,703,386 $16.70 $0.05 
Traceability reduced 
standard deviation of 
recall size by 50% 
$2,340,529 $22.95 $0.06 
Traceability reduced 
probability by 50% $2,331,636 $22.86 $0.06 
The difference in the No Traceability and the Traceability without benefits 
would also be the cost of the system on a yearly basis.  In this case, that cost is nearly $1 
million, $9.54 per head or $0.02 per boneless retail pound.  If the cost when reducing the 
probability of a recall, size of a recall, or standard deviation of recall size is smaller than the 
No Traceability cost, then the system has value.  In a small plant, none of these variables 
36 
reduced by up to 50% would be worth the investment.  If the average size of a recall is 
reduced by 50% the average cost is $640,000 over a no reduction in recall size, compared to 
the $1 million cost of traceability.   
 Furthermore, an analysis was conducted to find the breakeven point where the cost of 
adding traceability was equal to the cost of recalls with No Traceability ($1,372,009).  The 
results are displayed in Figure 9. 
 
Figure 9. 
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For the originally estimated cost of $1,000,000 for a traceability system in a small 
plant, a decrease of 77% of the average size of a recall is necessary to breakeven.  The costs 
are evaluated on $200,000 dollar increments and have a linear graph with an average of 16 
percentage points reduction needed for every $200,000 of cost.  The same analysis was 
completed for the reduction in probability, but even at a cost of only $100,000 and a 
reduction in the probability of 99% the breakeven cost could not be achieved.  This is linked 
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to the probability calculation as it is on a per pound basis and a small plant would produce 
fewer pounds than a large plant.  Additionally, a figure of the distribution of the average cost 
for a small plant is shown in Figure 10.  It is important to note that in most cases the cost is 
very small and only when a recall occurs, based on the random draw of probability and 
random size, will large expenses be incurred.  Thus, a small plant facing these investment 
cost, probability of a recall, and cost of a recall would not likely choose to adopt a 
traceability system. 
 Figure 10.  Distribution for cost of recalls in a small plant 
A large plant was defined as harvesting 5000 head per day.  The results for the 
simulation of average cost per year of recalls are in Figure 11.  The average cost, cost per 
head, and cost per pound are included for recalls without traceability, with traceability and no 
benefits, traceability and the reduce average size of a recall by 50%, the reduce standard 
deviation of pounds recalled, and the reduced probability of a recall by 50%.  The estimated 
38 
cost for traceability is $100,000 per year, $0.08 per head, or $.0002 per pound on a boneless 
basis, which is the difference in No Traceability and Traceability without benefits.  It is 
important to note that in the case of a large plant both a reduction of 50% in average recall 
size and probability of a recall have a net gain in value of $700,000 and $200,000 
respectively.  This is determined by comparing the average cost to the cost without 
traceability. 
 
Figure 11.  Average simulated recall cost of a 5000 head per day plant. 
 Average Cost Cost per head Cost per pound 
No Traceability $2,848,196 $2.23 $0.0061 
Traceability without 
benefits $2,948,864 $2.31 $0.0063 
Traceability reduced 
recall size by 50% $2,144,073 $1.68 $0.0046 
Traceability reduced 
standard deviation 
of recall size by 
50% 
$2,940,247 $2.30 $0.0063 
Traceability reduced 
probability by 50% $2,640,630 $2.07 $0.0056 
The estimated breakeven point in which the average cost with benefits is equal to the average 
cost with out traceability would occur with a reduction in the average recall size of 7%.  The 
breakeven point of $2,844,196 can also be reached with a reduction in the probability that a 
recall would occur by 15%.  This analysis was also evaluated at different levels of cost for 
both average recall size and probability.  The breakeven points are represented in Figures 12 
and 13.  For both cases, the results are linear and have an average reduction needed of 6 
percentage points for the average size and 15 percentage points for the probability of a recall 
39 
per $100,000 of cost.  Some variation occurs in the figure, in that the curve is not exactly 
linear which is due to the model being a simulation based on the average of a random draw 
for probability and size of a recall.  This variation for a large plant is greater than for a small 
plant and as the probability is larger due to more pounds being produced; therefore, a recall 
occurs more often.  Figure 14 represents the distribution of average cost of a recall in a large 
plant. 
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Figure 13. 
Breakeven point for probability of a recall
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Figure 14.  Distribution for cost of recalls in a large plant 
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 A sensitivity analysis was conducted for both a small and large plant for varying 
levels of probability.  This was completed as the most likely value for the probability may 
have been under estimated in a small plant and over estimated in a large plant.  This would 
be because the probability simply increased as the number of pounds produced increased 
between a small and large plant.  This would not consider the fact that a large plant, which 
may have more to lose in the event of a recall, may have more prevention steps in place.  
These may include more specialized personnel to perform duties in the plant and to handle a 
recall situation.  The results are shown in Figure 15 graphically and in table form in Figure 
16 with costs rounded to the nearest thousand dollars. 
 
Figure 15. 
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 Figure 16.  Average cost of recalls with Varying Levels of Probability 
Probability Small Plant Large Plant 
0.02 $2,343,000 $2,382,000 
0.07 $2,409,000 $2,494,000 
0.12 $2,470,000 $2,598,000 
0.17 $2,553,000 $2,710,000 
0.22 $2,608,000 $2,835,000 
0.27 $2,684,000 $2,938,000 
The sensitivity analysis represented in Figure 15 and in Figure 16 shows a higher cost 
for a large plant at all probabilities and a steeper slope.  The average cost increase for an 
increase in probability of 0.05 is $68,000 in a small plant and $111,000 for a large plant.  
Both sized plants would be more likely to adopt a traceability system as the probability of a 
recall increases, this is particularly true for a large plant. 
 
43 
CHAPTER 5.  CONCLUSION 
 
In a small plant the use of traceability to reduce the cost of a recall by reducing the 
average size of a recall or probability that a recall will occur is not economically feasible.  
The cost of the tracing system out weighs any reduced cost from logical reductions in size 
and chance of recalls.  This does not mean that the overall benefits of traceability are 
negative. Increases in efficiency may cover any additional costs.  In addition, the ability to 
pass data to both producers and customer about the meat source may provide value by 
effectively branding the product.  As prices of technology continue to drop and it becomes 
more common place, a small plant may be able to capture benefits by adopting the 
technology. 
In a large plant, the costs are much lower per pound due to the economies of scale by 
volume; therefore, the breakeven point of reducing a recall size by 7% or reducing the 
probability of a recall by 15% seems to be within reason.  This would be a logical investment 
if the reduction in cost of recalls alone covered the cost of traceability, as other benefits such 
as an increase in efficiency, consumer confidence, or increased market share would be of 
profit.  These may include increased efficiency, opportunities for export markets, an attribute 
of a branded product, and ability to pass market signals forward to consumers or backward in 
the food chain to producers. 
It is important to recap additional pre-event factors such as HACCP plans, recall 
insurance, sanitation, or testing procedures were not included.  Additional costs that may be 
incurred for a period after a recall include a decrease in market share or negative brand 
recognition. 
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This only brings up additional gaps in research that could be answered.  For example 
are the estimated costs of a traceability system with cut-to-carcass precision accurate?  
Furthermore, after the industry’s intensive concentration of preventing recalls including 
testing of product, cleaning methods, and recall awareness from mock recalls, is there error 
that could be improved with the use of traceability.  Lastly, what level of precision in 
traceability is required to benefit in a recall situation? 
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AMI – America Meat Institute 
AI – Avian Influenza 
BLS – Bureau of Labor and Statistics 
BSE – Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy 
CDC – Center for Disease Control 
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ERS – Economic Research Service 
EPA – Environmental Protection Agency 
FDA – Food and Drug Administration 
FMD – Foot and Mouth Disease 
FMIA – Federal Meat Inspection Act 
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L. monocytogenes – Listeria monocytogenes 
NAIS – National Animal Identification Plan 
OFO – Office of Field Operations 
PPIA – Poultry Products Inspection Act 
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PR – Pathogen Reduction 
RNR – Recall Notification Report 
RMS – Recall Management Staff 
RTE – Ready-to-eat 
SSOP – Sanitation Standard Operating Procedure 
SOP – Standard Operating Procedure 
USAIP – United States Animal Identification Plan 
USDA – United States Department of Agriculture 
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APPENDIX A 
 
Number of recalls conducted through FSIS per cause between 1997 and 2004. 
Year Total Recalls 
E. 
Coli Listeria Salmonella 
Illness/ 
pathogen Foreign Allergen Label Other 
1997 27 6 3 1 0 8 2 2 5 
1998 44 13 6 3 2 10 0 4 6 
1999 62 10 31 6 0 3 0 6 6 
2000 76 21 35 4 0 5 0 9 2 
2001 95 26 25 2 1 10 11 15 5 
2002 129 35 42 4 0 5 22 15 6 
2003 68 11 15 2 0 4 12 15 9 
2004 48 6 14 2 0 7 12 1 6 
Total 549 128 171 24 3 52 59 67 45 
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APPENDIX B 
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